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Wonderful treatment  
 
Martyn Evans 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A friend of mine once had the misfortune to suffer acute appendicitis and be 
admitted to hospital for emergency surgery. The operation was uneventful and 
wholly successful, my friend recovered in a manner and at a rate that was typical for 
his age (he was at the time in his forties) and he was discharged, went home, and 
soon resumed normal daily life. Notwithstanding the original misfortune, the whole 
episode was otherwise entirely unremarkable from a medical viewpoint. However, 
telling me about it later my friend described the familiar signs and symptoms of his 
digestive system starting to work again as he convalesced and, as he put it, from his 
perspective as a biologist ‘It was wonderful to observe my digestive system – my 
body – coming back to life.’ 
The treatment involved in his case, appendectomy, is in biophysical terms well 
understood, as is why it should be needed and how it works. It is, from a surgical 
perspective, entirely ordinary and routine, even mechanical – hardly the stuff of 
wonder. And yet, as my friend – himself a trained biological scientist – observed, its 
result was in part wonderful. In this chapter I want to explore, and defend, that 
remark, and I want to do so in the context not merely of my friend’s treatment but 
of the idea of treatment as such. Successful or otherwise, all treatments, I will 
suggest, are at least partly wonderful. 
This is perhaps such a surprising claim that it needs some clarification here, right 
at the outset. Three of our patients might protest against the claim – Jake hotly; Liz 
and, perhaps, Jen in more muted and inward terms. Jake’s defiant “I don’t want any 
more tubes stuck up and through me. I’m not a freak… I don’t want any more of 
those bloody tests and I don’t want any bloody pills either” is no endorsement of the 
wonder of treatment. Liz’s treatment elicits her twitches, groans, revulsion, nausea – 
as well as her disbelief that any woman might actually want to watch the 
proceedings on a television monitor. Jen endures humiliation at ‘her body letting her 
down’; ‘How many times do I have to do this? How will I ever cope?”. She is amazed 
at what she does cope with; but any wonder here seems directed at her own 
resilient spirit than at medicine’s efforts. 
So let my clarification start with what I am not claiming – that individual 
treatments are unfailingly occasions for grateful joy. Even when they are free of 
discomfort, easily tolerated, and rapidly effective I am not claiming that, in showing 
this, we have disclosed what makes them wonderful. Nor is their wonder a matter of 
technical bravura. Admittedly it might be said that, in the accumulated observations 
that led to a treatment’s being conjectured and refined, or in the intelligence 
through which theoretical understandings of the body explain how a treatment can 
work, or in the meticulous practicalities of the way a treatment is administered, all 
treatments (or at least all those that work well) represent wonderful gains in our 
understanding and therapeutic capacity. But such wonderfulness is temporary, 
simply part of our acknowledgement of something novel, our relieved greeting of 
another victory in a long struggle. The enduring wonderfulness of treatment lies 
elsewhere, and indeed it permeates the very idea of treatment. 
Treatment consists – and its wonderfulness is provoked – in the interaction 
between the therapeutic procedure and the person treated: in the inducing of 
change in the bodily make-up of the patient; in the deliberate constructive alteration 
of the patient’s embodied experience; in short, in meddling in the flesh of another 
person. What is wonderful is that this is possible; that it works as often as it does; 
and, most of all, that it works because our world and our experience of the world are 
embodied in our flesh. 
To change our flesh is to change – hopefully, for the better – the way that we 
experience the world. This embodiment, of which we are forcibly reminded every 
time we try to affect it by direct physical intervention, is enduringly wonderful. From 
embodiment’s wonderfulness, the wonderfulness of treatment directly stems. 
 
Bodily wonder 
 
ordinary living, being and doing: what we take for granted 
 
I have noticed elsewhere1 the virtues of Rene Leriche’s remark that ‘health is life 
lived in the silence of the organs’2. Shrewd though it be, the remark has its 
shortcomings, among them that it ignores the obvious fact that the skin is one organ 
whose silence is not a precondition for health. In all sorts of ordinary doings and 
undertakings in daily life our skin will register all sorts of sensations including 
discomforts and irritations. When we try to stop still for a moment our attention is 
sometimes freed to register these discomforts. It happens that I am writing the 
present lines on a laptop computer which for once does indeed sit in my lap; I’m 
virtually encased in an old armchair, perched just in front of the full-height windows 
of an upper-floor lounge, looking out over the garden. Right now I would describe 
myself as perfectly healthy, although – now that I pause to register the facts – my 
arms are irritated by the rough wool of my sweater, the cushion in the small of my 
back seems always in the wrong place, my chair forces upon me a maddeningly 
crooked posture, I’ve an excessively acidic tang in my mouth from drinking strong 
tea earlier and my stomach is restless for some food; and finally my reading glasses 
make the garden through the window seem a dim and misty place. None of these 
discomforts seems to have any bearing on my conviction that I am in normal health; 
each of them however is a reminder of the essential physicality of experience 
whether as foreground or as background. 
Our bodies make our worlds just as in turn they are made by those worlds. When 
I was younger I liked the appearance of my hands – small, neat, lithe, a pianist’s 
hands as well as a furniture-maker’s hands. Now (thanks partly to years of exposure 
to the sawdust and solvents of the furniture trade) my hands look considerably older 
than I do, and I will consider this change further in a little while. But despite their 
appearance my hands continue to work, and well enough. They act in the world yet I 
have not the faintest conception of how my thoughts and intentions, in terms of the 
words that I want to type, can possibly actuate the accomplishments of my hands, in 
terms of sequences of keystrokes correctly delivered; more generally, I have not – 
and it seems to me that I cannot have – any true and deep conception of how my 
will is manifest in physical action. (The best account – that of Schopenhauer, 
according to whom the action is nothing other than the intention observed from 
outside, and the intention nothing other than the action experienced from the inside 
– solves the puzzle only by attempting to dissolve it, almost to deny it as a puzzle at 
all.3) Equally, experience is the inward expression of outward events and processes: 
yet I have not the slightest conception – and it seems to me that I cannot have – of 
how the physical, material sequences of touch and sensation and perception 
become manifest in the non-material reality of felt, qualitative experience. 
This brings into sharp focus the primary ground of treatment’s wonderfulness – 
the incredible constitution of experience, even the possibility of experience, by that 
subtly and minutely organised substance that we call flesh. Nowhere is this more 
graphically laid bare for us than by the sometimes-questionable products of Gunter 
von Hagens’s ‘plastinated’ anatomical dissections. Even before we come to the 
dazzling array of neural circuitry within which we take consciousness to have its chief 
administration, the possibility of continued animal life lies spectacularly in the 
visceral manifold lying with the chest and abdomen. These engines of circulation, 
respiration, digestion, cleave together in a complex, coloured, congested heap of 
flesh; its untidy, haphazard scrambling nonetheless conforms closely to a regular 
blueprint – a blueprint that sustains all higher forms of air-breathing, warm-blooded, 
locomotive life. 
This gaudy pile, in equal measure revolting and wondrous to behold, is our inner 
permit to exist at all; without it our brains and sensory organs can neither function 
nor arise in the first place. It is the ‘soft machinery’4 that causes Liz’s world briefly to 
swim and dim as the shocking aspects of her treatment fully register, that turns Jen’s 
bed abruptly into a latrine; yet upon this machinery they – we – depend utterly and 
moment-by-moment. It is the boiler-room of fleshly life; and our life is a fleshly 
one.5 
 
 
the dazzling richness of perceptual experience 
 
Nowhere perhaps is the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of our condition more remarkable 
than in ordinary perceptual experience. We accept without question just those five 
primary senses through which we engage the world, even construct it, and we give 
barely a thought to the other ways in which the world might – must – appear to 
other kinds of creatures: we take the world at face value, presuming that the face it 
shows to us is of necessity its real face. Just as effortlessly we embrace the 
contrasting modalities of the different individual senses, and their fusion in a single, 
continuous world of multi-modal experience. Thus we accept without question the 
activeness of touch, and we have no difficulty intermingling active tactile experience 
with the helpless passivity of hearing. We accept without question the precise and 
stable structural repertoire of the illuminated world within our incredibly finely-
grained visual field, alongside the rich chaos of fleeting, evocative, often un-
nameable swirls of scent and flavour that assail our senses of smell and taste: the 
velvet pink petals and heady scent of an opened damask rose offer a single, albeit 
complex, fused experience. And we almost invariably overlook proprioception – our 
inward, ‘blindfolded’ knowledge of our own moment-by-moment orientation, 
posture, extension – in whose absence we couldn’t walk or raise a spoonful of food 
to our mouths without constant visual monitoring and correction of our 
movements.6 
Each of our senses can give us pleasure, and each can give us disgust – although 
now it becomes more apparent that our reactions, be they of delight or revulsion, 
involve thinking and imagining directly in the identification of what it is we sense or 
perceive. We don’t see or touch or hear things innocently: they carry meaning for us 
even before actual sensation (which is in part what sensory recognition comes to). 
Even smell and taste, which might seem to affect our experience with particularly 
unavoidable immediacy, can be modified by expectation and imagination (a smell 
like strong cheese is enjoyable if it is clearly associated with actual strong cheese, 
and anything but enjoyable if its source lies elsewhere, and this remains true even if 
the source is a matter of what we merely believe rather than actually know to be 
true). Sensory experience can be frustratingly ‘thin’ – think of the use of sensory 
deprivation as a punishment – or it can be overwhelmingly intense, even in the 
absence of direct stimulation of pain. Sights and sounds and flavours can be simply 
too much to take in all at once; we have limiting comfortable levels of sensory 
experience, as well as enjoyable or aversive characteristic objects of that experience. 
Any and all of this might have been otherwise, but it is not otherwise; the facts of 
our perceptual life are as they are. Our sensory experience is contingent, intense, 
close-knit, almost entirely continuous, and rich beyond measure. At the same time it 
is curiously limited: we have no intrinsic sensory experience of mass; we cannot feel 
magnetism; we are blind to all but a fraction of radiated energy frequencies; we 
have only a coarse awareness of pressure variation; we cannot ‘meter’ the passing of 
time, and so on. Perhaps above all, though, our sensory experience is unconsciously 
integrated: we have no awareness of the joining together of the multiple worlds of 
sound, space, sight and smell into a single world of embodied existence. They are co-
fabricated in our brains, fused with our equally-unquestioning sense of our own 
identity and continuity, into what Kant intriguingly called the ‘manifold of 
perception’.7 The world’s muted daily ordinariness – but also its breathtaking 
dynamism and beauty – arise in and through this glorious symphony of sensory 
embodiment. 
And its greatest glory is also its greatest wonder – the wonder that we can have 
this inward, felt quality of sensation at all: the wonder that sensory experience is not 
simply information enabling us to negotiate a survival in the world around us but 
rather the vivid aliveness of being embodied creatures in a material world. Our 
experience is the world – a world of externalities that, in and through our 
consciousness (and presumably the consciousness of many, many forms of animal 
life), has been given a qualitative, felt, ‘inside’. Nothing, it seems to me, is more 
wonderful than this. Only slightly less wonderful is its modulation by medicine. 
 the material grounding of behaviour, in sickness and health 
 
Not only do we sense and experience the world around us: we act in and on it. And 
just as our perception is the experiential ‘interior’ of material things and processes, 
so our actions are the experiential ‘interior’ of the processes by which we govern 
and are governed by the material world. We habitually and unhesitatingly act and 
move fluently; we think, do, respond to and immerse ourselves in a rich, multi-
sensory and above all embodied world – doing all of this generally without conscious 
effort; fluidly, often carelessly; mostly without wonder. 
Our baseline for effort or conscious attention rests both upon unthinking 
embodied fluency and upon the automatic coherence we somehow make of our 
kaleidoscopic sensory experience. Equally it seems that our baseline for intentional 
action is blindly governed by patterned physical interactions at the biochemical and 
biomechanical level. We are almost never aware of these interactions, some of them 
in turn governed by unalterable patterns in our genes and others by adaptive 
patterns in our nervous systems. We can do nothing about (though perhaps we 
could do little without) the instincts that are characteristic of our biological species, 
and that fit us generally to survive in physical terms. Our ‘primitive reactions’8 are 
our broadly-shared genetic blueprint coming to life, for the most part protectively, in 
our outward behaviour – turning abruptly at a sound or at a tap on the shoulder, 
recoiling from painful or disgusting stimuli, scratching an itch, seeking out warmth 
and light and comfort, enjoying sounds within a certain range of pitch and volume 
and consonance, trembling when afraid, hesitating at the unknown, acknowledging 
the human face and its likenesses, attending to the sound of human (and other 
mammalian) infants, and – I dare say – sometimes gazing in rapt wonder at what is 
remote. 
These reactions are built-into us regardless of when or where we are born. Other 
reactions come about, or are at least activated, by the cultural and social 
environment surrounding us. Our social habits, our learned conformities, become 
automatic and in time quite as unconscious (subjectively speaking) as our biological 
reactions. This is true also of our idiosyncratic behaviour, our individual habits that 
had perhaps a conscious beginning but develop a life and compulsion of their own, 
moulding the way we speak, act, and think. 
The first wonderful thing about all of this – comparable to the wonder of 
materially-grounded perceptual experience – is how essentially simple chemical 
interactions can in predictable combination generate reliable, repeated, complex 
behaviour. This is already wonderful enough in the case of more specialised 
creatures than ourselves: for what essentially chemical combination of the actions of 
genes could possibly ‘code’ in a reliable, causal, manner for the building of a bird’s 
nest, still less for a social artefact such as a beehive where the interactions of 
different individuals and their roles make a kind of unconscious joint authorship of 
such beautiful structures? But staggeringly, in our own case the mechanical 
influences of our genetic complement enable enormous flexibility and adaptability; 
they produce our seemingly unopposable mixture of curiosity, risk-taking, individual 
aggrandisement and collective prudence. 
The second wonderful thing about embodied action is what it feels like, in 
ordinary health. We take for granted (to the point of almost never finding time to 
recognise and revel in its wonderfulness) our fluent, carefree, agency in the world. 
Our experience of our actions is of a physical body moved by will; yet our material 
reality is of a will both fuelled and constrained by physicality. We feel as though our 
bodies enact our will; it would be truer to say that our wills express our bodies. The 
Cartesian conceit under which we normally labour would be wonderful enough, of 
course; but no less wonderful is this idea of channelling, into concrete deliberate 
action in the world around us, new combinations of those felt impulses and 
possibilities that are fabricated in our flesh by genes, instincts, and habits. 
To be in ordinary health is, in part, to be and to act in this ordinary way, taking 
our ordinary being and our ordinary acting for granted, utterly unaware of what 
underlies them.  
 
illness and other metamorphoses 
 
Perhaps this taken-for-grantedness explains our sense of absurd contingency about 
falling ill, a sense positioned somewhere amid bafflement, outrage and 
embarrassment. One moment we are engaged in the ordinary affairs of living – 
absorbed, preoccupied, or bored as the case may be – and the next moment all our 
calculations are set aside, all our taken-for-grantedness is thrust back in our teeth. 
Like accidents, illnesses should not happen but they do. They should happen to other 
people, in other lives, yet they happen to us, in ours. They should not happen now, 
so inconveniently, but in the future when we can afford the luxury of the time and 
attention that illnesses demand; but they will not wait for us. Or they impertinently 
remind us of our own behavioural choices, the risks to which we’ve exposed our 
health; and it seems (as John Diamond brutally illustrates in his autobiographical C9) 
to us that we were unfairly dealt with when we fail to ‘get away’ with risks run 
blithely and successfully by others. 
However in bringing about unwelcome change, illnesses serve doubly to 
emphasise the general point that concerns me here: they remind us forcibly of the 
materiality of our existence, and they remind us of how tightly we are bound to it. 
Perhaps it takes as much self-mastery to be able to ignore pleasures as to be able to 
ignore pains, but illnesses change not only how we can be (our moment-to-moment 
experience) but what we can do and attempt. Moral fortitude may help us bear up 
under immobility and weakness, but it can do little about the basic limitations that 
these force upon us. The disruption and alteration of our ordinary existence and 
function is in its way only one more manifestation of the wonder of embodied 
experience. While it lasts, illness transforms the world – something as worthy of 
wonder as it is, for a time, shocking – but it also, astonishingly, can transform our 
own materiality. 
Of course, whether well or ill, we are all helpless passengers in the long, slow, 
train-crash that is ageing. The poet Philip Larkin compared the hands of the elderly 
to toads – pudgy, wrinkled, inflexible, mottled.10 Two toads, unhappily, now squat 
on the keyboard of my laptop; they are part of me, and my access to the world 
through them is the same as it ever was; but falling within my own view they strike 
me unfavourably as (I imagine) they do others. Blooms that are now rather 
shrivelled, they are still my trusted ambassadors in the world immediately around 
me but they no longer advertise or introduce my former, youthful self. Yet – 
occupational injuries and spills apart – I have not consciously brought about this 
metamorphosis. I have not even tried to stop its effects with moisturising or alleged 
‘anti-ageing’ creams as so many people, men included these days, try to do. My 
hands’ metamorphosis is part of me yet independent of me. And it forcibly reminds 
me of the contingency of my body. Here it is – a bag of meat and offal and bones, as 
Bryan Magee brutally puts it – that has slowly, over a lifetime, extruded itself out of 
available matter and space to occupy one (and one only) of infinitely many possible 
variations on the basic human form.11 I’m stuck with it; I’m stuck as it. Here my toad 
hands squat in front of me and neither I nor they can do a thing about it in any 
fundamental sense. 
But although all this sounds rather sour and resentful, it is also a recognition of 
something wonderful. Toad-like or not, my over-aged hands are one illustrative 
aspect of the wonder of the gross morphological changes the human body 
undergoes over a lifetime. A typical human proceeds from conception through 
explosive gestation and live birth, to a parade of changing body forms and facial 
appearances in infancy, childhood, puberty, maturity, reproductive prime, the long 
middle years, elderly decline, death, disintegration: every aspect of this deserves 
wonder. 
I recently gazed, transfixed, at the youngest occupant of an American paediatric 
intensive care unit. Not only had I no personal connection with this desperately 
fragile infant; more shockingly, given the child’s heartbreaking prematurity, his 
appearance was such that at one level it was hard to recognise between us any 
classificatory connection as humans either. The tiniest living human I have ever seen 
with my own eyes, this looked more like a shrunken rubber balloon with spider limbs 
and a perishable, convulsing, cling-film surface. Intubated, bandaged, blindfolded, 
wrenched by natural mishap from the uterus where he might have flourished, 
clinging to life by means that were as much metaphysical as physical (I mean, his 
sheer will-to-live), he had become the pulsing junction-box for all the sterile electro-
mechanical machinery around and partly within him. In safer circumstances it is 
obvious that through this crucible-stage we have all, each one of us, voyaged – 
foetally curled and amniotically swathed rather than spread-eagled supine upon a 
cotton sheet in sterile air. This infant had wonder within him: against all odds he still 
lived (and, perhaps, lives still; an email enquiry would disclose the facts but I have 
not the courage to send it). Yet also he had wonder around him, in the institutional 
love – there is no other word – that invests such technical bravura in his struggle to 
live another day: and furthermore he emanated wonder in the invitation to see him 
as one of us. 
It is remarkable that those who know us as individuals recognise a continuing 
underlying experiential unity – we might, though need not, call it ‘identity’ – through 
the gross outward changes (a favourite party game challenges participants to 
recognise their friends from childhood photographs); but in some ways it is still more 
remarkable that we recognise this continuity in our own experience: that a rich ‘I’ 
persists doggedly and in later years stoically through physical metamorphosis of a 
kind that, if compressed, would be the stuff of nightmares. 
In a sense, an intense compression of this sort actually is involved in the 
metamorphosis of illness. This can be acute and frightening, as Jane Macnaughton 
noted in the case of the child whose face ‘disappeared’ as her connective tissue 
desiccated (albeit temporarily) before her parents’ horrified gaze.12 But the 
metamorphosis is still remarkable even in less extreme cases: weight may be gained 
or lost in significant amounts; limbs and joints swell alarmingly with inflammation or 
oedema; there may be colour and complexion changes in fever; fluids may 
accumulate or leak out; there may be unorthodox growth – new tissues in new 
shapes, tumours, scars, keloids. Or there may be a ‘kinetic’ metamorphosis – a 
change in the nature and range of movement, a speeding up, a slowing down, 
spasms, rigidity, tremor. And so on. To us who – as we often believe in times of 
health – ‘inhabit’ our bodies it becomes clear during illness that we are our bodies, 
for better or worse, and that our bodies are changing in a way that seems to be at 
odds with our continuity as selves. 
Wondrously of course, the metamorphoses of illness often go into reverse, 
sometimes just as quickly as they came about. We often do recover our former 
poise, posture, balance, watertight-ness, colour, odour, mass, shape (or at any rate 
most of it), with perhaps a residue of the change left in terms of scarring or stiffness 
as a longer-term legacy. Again, the continuity of the self persists through the 
metamorphosis. However, sometimes metamorphosis is not merely a result of a 
treatment, it is constituted by the treatment. This is typical of surgery – the cutting 
out and removal of obstructive or intrusive or dangerously broken flesh. For Liz the 
pervasive, persistent horror of her own treatment was the excision of a biopsy with 
an electrical loop: “…a sense of heat, the smell of burning flesh. This smell was the 
worst thing of all.” Part of her had been both removed and, unavoidably, presented 
to her nostrils for what it had been changed into: burnt meat. This is a truly graphic 
form of what I earlier called ‘meddling in the flesh’. For the physician, the experience 
is doubtless masked by routine; but for Liz, a conscious patient, it is an existential 
threat, a reminder that what can in the right circumstances be appetising is also, in 
the wrong circumstances, a vignette of fiery death. 
Those who administer such treatments do well to be mindful of their ambiguity, 
and this is equally true of far more mundane things than excision. When Jen’s cancer 
nurse brings her a wig in preparation for the impending loss of her hair, Jen is 
transported back to her youth and to the beauty of ‘her swinging chestnut bob … her 
best asset’. Perhaps her hair is no longer chestnut, and indeed its greying and 
crisping are part of Jen’s life-cycle metamorphosis, but it still connects her with the 
selves she is losing – her own and Geoff’s alike in their handsome youth, Geoff’s now 
in most senses, given his withdrawn and unwitting state. The wig is kindly meant, a 
form of palliative treatment, but for the moment at least it is for Jen anything but a 
comfort. 
When we do recover, it is of course a wonderful thing in every sense to regain 
ordinary embodiment and perception and function and self-experience. In terms of 
ordinary embodiment, when my friend coolly watched over his own recovery from 
appendicectomy, what was at stake for him as a biologist was among other things a 
kind of existential demonstration of the principles of biochemistry and physiology. 
That gaudy ‘heap’ of viscera had suffered the insult of surgery, ridden the blow, 
recoiled, sprung back into place, recovered its poise. Human interference had 
altered its circumstances, brutally, though intelligently and constructively, and in 
response that same ‘heap’ had spontaneously – spontaneously – resumed the 
ordinary business of being organised flesh. Knowing how it happens is not the same 
as knowing why it happens, and it seems to me that at a deep level we do not really 
know either why or how. 
Other wonderful aspects of recovery appear within our embodied experience. 
What had become stale to us before falling ill can taste fresh again; neglected 
pleasures present themselves for reconsideration; we have the chance to make new 
resolutions (however fragile) about how we will make better use of our regained 
health and strength. All these good things are – or would be, did we not habitually 
forget them – the opportunities of ordinary embodied life. More particularly they 
belong to those holding, as Sontag puts it, passports in the ‘kingdom of the well’;13 
by contrast they are just what are longed-for by the sick. In ‘The Building’ Larkin 
cruelly picks bare the hospital in-patient’s longing for the free outside, with all its 
wonderful, reckless, humdrum ordinariness that is (seemingly) forever denied 
him.14 In a less literal sense he is describing Rachel, too – not in hospital, but just as 
assuredly imprisoned by her diabetes, when an adult’s caution prevents her from 
enjoying the treats of a school trip. At an alternative holiday camp for other diabetic 
children she would be one among many ‘exactly like me … I’ll have a lot of fun and 
I’ll be ordinary. Believe me, that would be the best thing of all.’ 
We have throughout been recalling the extraordinary wonderfulness of ordinary 
embodiment; but it has taken us some philosophical effort to do so. For those whose 
illness has deprived them of ordinary being, recalling it needs no such effort. The 
trouble lies in reclaiming it, and this – or as much of it as is possible – is treatment’s 
aim. 
 
Existential wonder 
 
that we are here at all 
 
Whenever an individual patient receives treatment, that treatment is a response not 
merely to a given systemic (physiological, biochemical) disruption but to a 
disturbance in that remotely improbable material accident that constitutes each one 
of us. So is it not wonderful that we are here at all? Bill Bryson puts the point 
inimitably: 
 
For you to be here now trillions of drifting atoms had somehow to assemble in an 
intricate and curiously obliging manner to create you. It’s an arrangement so 
specialized and particular that it has never been tried before and will only exist 
this once … letting you experience the supremely agreeable but generally under-
appreciated state known as existence. … For all their devoted attention, your 
atoms don’t actually care about you – indeed, don’t even know that you are 
there. They don’t even know that they are there. They are mindless particles, 
after all, and not even themselves alive. (… If you were to pick yourself apart with 
tweezers, one atom at a time, you would produce a mound of fine atomic dust, 
none of which had ever been alive but all of which had once been you.) Yet 
somehow for the period of your existence they will answer to a single rigid 
impulse: to keep you you.15  
 
Both illness and treatment are – in different ways – organised disruptions to an 
existing ‘arrangement’ of atoms (only the agencies of disruption are different). 
Treatment is not conceived in these terms, of course, but nonetheless in material 
terms that is what it comes to. This uncomfortable equivalence is very present to 
Jen, who feels her body is ‘letting her down’ in response to treatment, 
notwithstanding that it is precisely because her body has (as it were) already ‘let her 
down,’ in falling ill, that the treatment is being offered. The resemblance goes 
further: seeing how focused the nurses are ‘made her realise, as nothing had, that 
the treatment was serious. Cancer was serious.’ At some stages of her treatment, 
Jen will find illness and treatment partly indistinguishable. Both the cancer and the 
chemotherapy are organised disruptions to her body’s patterns, and her atoms’ 
arrangements. 
Treatment is possible of course because (astoundingly) our ‘arrangements’ are 
patterned in ways so consistent that, as organisms, we can conform to a 
specification allowing us to come into the world, survive, beget offspring, and even 
come to a rudimentary understanding of what our patterns are meant to be and 
how they might be restored. In drawing on an understanding of this conformity, the 
fact and success of treatment invites a further level of wonderment. 
Yet still more wonderful is the accident (unless one’s religious belief suggests 
otherwise) that at some level of increasing complexity amongst simpler, inert forms 
of matter an entirely new phenomenon emerges – consciousness, finding (so far as 
we know) its highest and perhaps only truly self-reflective form in embodied human 
nature. We are fantastically complex arrangements of very simple, very inert, parts. 
How mere complexity gives rise to the inner reality of sensation – let alone 
experience and self-reflection, and the ability to ponder questions of wonder – is as 
much a philosophical as it is a scientific mystery: perhaps more so. Treatment is 
ordinarily an intelligent, purposive, intentional and inter-personal activity. In the 
clinical consultation two intelligences – two emergences of intelligence from 
patterns of mere inert matter – jointly consider the problem that one of them has an 
altered experience. This is already astounding enough. But in treatment, they 
intervene in the pattern, in the ‘arrangement’, hoping thereby to intervene in the 
experience. In recognising this, we are drawn to further wonder. And in recognising 
this – this ‘drawing to wonder’ – we open the door to ontological wonder: wonder at 
ourselves, our agency and, indeed, our own capacity to wonder at all. Through our 
wondering, the otherwise material Universe wonders at itself; and heady though this 
thought may be, it suffuses the wonderfulness of treatment. 
 
that we are capable of ecstasy and agony  
 
The imagination is involved in ecstasy as much as in the agony of suffering. If we 
have led anything like an ordinarily fortunate life we will know at first hand most of 
the characteristic forms of sensory ecstasy, but we derive the fullest enjoyment of 
them through the imagination: anticipating, savouring, remembering them as well as 
– in effect – ‘enduring’ them. Like the minor irritants of an almost-comfortable 
posture that I described earlier, the ecstasies of the senses give the lie to Leriche’s 
otherwise attractive view of health as ‘life lived in the silence of the organs’. But they 
take their identity in contrast to the ordinariness of what plausibly is organic 
‘silence’. Ecstasy makes a pleasing poetic contrast with agony, but its existential 
contrast is with dull flatness, with tedium or with simply not noticing. Ecstasy is a 
special kind of noticing or attending, with always a small part of the attending being 
reflexive, turned back on itself, relishing the self-acknowledgement involved. In its 
way ecstasy involves a form of wonder because the imagination itself is an instance 
of what is wonderful, as well as the means through which we can recognise wonder. 
But – soberingly – this must also be true of suffering. The very root of wonder found 
in ecstasy has its baleful counterpart in the imaginative dimension of suffering: we 
are such creatures as can not merely experience pain but be tormented by it in 
anticipating it, abjuring it whilst undergoing it, and remembering it even as we claw 
our way back out of it. Suffering involves a reflexive act of the imagination, 
something as regrettably worthy of wonder as ecstasy is ebulliently worthy. 
In this sense, treatment often aims at transforming the content of the sensory 
provocations of our imaginations. Sadly treatment itself may, en route to perhaps a 
successful conclusion, provoke our imaginations adversely. Some of those 
undergoing chemotherapy suffer ‘anticipatory vomiting’ in the days or hours before 
a treatment cycle; the knowledge of what lies ahead is enough. Jen’s imagination 
thrust tuberculosis far deeper than cancer in its perceived threat to her, and only the 
seriousness of the treatment she is in fact to receive reveals the seriousness of the 
disease she actually suffers. Poignantly, as we’ve seen, her imagination has also 
burdened the cosmetic provision of a wig with grievous symbolism.  
 
our existential ‘metamorphosis’ 
 
We earlier reviewed the astounding metamorphic career of our physical forms, from 
conception to disintegration. It’s of course matched – with due allowance for 
individual variations and cultural modifications – by the metamorphic career of our 
selves as agents. We begin and all-too-frequently end in helplessness both physical 
and intellectual, though the resemblance perhaps stops there. The will-to-live that 
commands our infant bodies’ growth – via our carers’ attention – has a mordant 
echo in death-struggles, but there it will not strike others as having the same sense-
making basis that nurtures the infant as such. But the will-to-live is for most of our 
lives obscured by the will-to-do, especially in such agent-centred contexts as liberal 
industrial societies. 
Ask people when was the best time of their lives and they may well respond in 
terms of the period when they most felt they could act as they willed, when they 
most felt in control of their futures. Both in bodily and in spiritual terms, it is 
common for us to find a sense of invincibility in our prime – whenever we take that 
to be – replaced by doubt and scepticism as the next step in a relentless transition to 
what we may expect to be shocking vulnerability in decrepit age, and ultimate 
dissolution. Ignoring the intervening stages, how can it be possible that a will, an 
agency, can come into being from nothing; act for a while purposively and even 
(apparently) without impediment on life’s stage; and then diminish into 
annihilation? The great actors of history may have shaped the world we live in today 
without the slightest possibility of their acting again in our own time. Some very few 
of us (as I write, the inspirational Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi has 
just been released from house arrest) might move continents in their own lifetimes 
without the slightest prior basis in action before those lifetimes. At all levels of effect 
and power, human agency is somehow born of nothing and for a while simply 
cannot be repressed – it bristles and sparks and shoves almost unceasingly – and 
then it declines into extinction and, in most cases, oblivion as well. 
A paler reflection of this, though in existential terms at least as terrible, is the rise 
and fall of cognition – one of agency’s aspects in the ordinary case. Minds arise 
without antecedents, and minds disappear – mostly without trace. Is this not to be 
wondered at? 
Treatment (for example in addressing metabolic or psychotic disorders) can aim 
at adjusting the speed, the shape, and to an extent the duration of this metamorphic 
career ‘curve’; and this is wonderful enough in itself. But the basic framing of agency 
is beyond treatment’s scope. Geoff’s plight consists in part in the untimely loss of 
agency through his losing social awareness and interaction. One of the ironies of his 
treatment is that what it achieves – a ‘lightening of mood’ that is noticed, seemingly, 
only by the clinical staff at his nursing home – seems to benefit others rather than 
himself. His interactions with them have dwindled to little more than disturbances 
among his body’s reactions of which he himself appears unaware. His ‘existential 
metamorphosis’ is prematurely complete. 
 
Wonder in practice 
 
In this chapter I have tried to take wonder seriously as underlying and revealed in 
treatment: successful or otherwise, tolerable or otherwise, the very conception and 
ambition of treatment rests on (as well as intervenes in) the larger underlying 
wonder of human embodied experience. This does not exhaust the importance of 
wonder in clinical practice however, and I will conclude with no more than a 
summary of some of its further ‘supporting roles’. Each of these I think deserves 
further reflection beyond what I can attempt here. 
Since the clinical encounter typically involves the two agencies, the two 
‘intelligences’ as I earlier put it, of patient and clinician, it is convenient to let this 
review rest on their respective shoulders. 
The clinician is first and foremost another embodied experiencing flesh, closely 
resembling the patient in virtually every important respect as regards the two large 
categories of ‘bodily wonder’ and ‘existential wonder’ under which I have considered 
our patients and their treatment. When the clinician addresses the patient’s illness it 
is also her own mortality that she confronts; when she meddles in the patient’s flesh, 
that flesh is also, in the final analysis, her own. This is easy to overlook and difficult 
to be mindful of; but one should be mindful of it nonetheless. Both the intimacy of 
this fleshly transaction, and the respect such intimacy demands, are mutual in 
character, and they demand that the intimacy be tempered by a kind of ‘coolness,’ 
as Jane Macnaughton and I suggested in the previous Volume in this series.16 The 
attitude of wonder involves both a preparative pause – before accepting the 
invitation to try to understand – and an implicit recognition of the limitations of the 
self and of one’s own agency. Together these features of the attitude of wonder 
offer a good foundation upon which to build ‘cool intimacy’. 
The clinician also has to avoid complacency about either the general promise of a 
treatment or its application to an individual patient. Medical knowledge is at any one 
time provisionally adequate to a proportion of the questions that clinical practice 
throws up; but embodied human nature is enduringly complicated. The tenacity with 
which the desperately ill cling to life sometimes appears to suggest that nature is 
ineradicable; but we also know how fragile is our health and vigour. In undergoing 
treatment the patient risks disappointment or worse, and in the company of the 
clinician must submit himself to both the ‘autonomy’ of nature and the vagaries of 
circumstance. Treatments sometimes work and they sometimes fail, and (as is 
perhaps in Liz’s mind when she ponders the 95% success rate of the procedure she 
has just undergone) the odds of success or failure are no more than a description of 
what is observed, statistically, over a dismayingly heterogeneous population. It is a 
matter of ontological wonder rooted in the consistency of our nature that, in the 
medium run, the aggregate numbers do come out right; but it may be a matter of 
moral wonder rooted in the lust for life that patients take their chances with toxic 
and uncertain treatments, hoping not to find themselves ‘holding the wrong 
passports’ when the numbers are counted. 
In the end, perhaps our embodied natures – whether as patients or as clinicians – 
more strongly underpin, or constrain, the degree of our individual strength of will 
than we might like to suppose (or than is accounted for in the dominant place in so 
much health care ethical analysis that is occupied by an attachment to autonomy); 
for further exploration, see Iona Heath’s chapter in this Volume. Notwithstanding, 
we persist in seeking, offering and taking treatments with all their uncertainty. Our 
willingness to do so perhaps does not consciously echo the ‘wonder of treatment’ in 
the underlying sense that I have tried to explore in this Chapter, but I think the 
willingness expresses that wonder, nonetheless. 
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